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Abstract 
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Gothenburg 
Semester: Spring 2014 
Authors: Emelie Chappell and Magnus Dettmar 
Supervisors: Emmeli Runesson and Jan Marton  
Title: Capitalization of software development costs - a comparison between 
EU and U.S. 
Background: The world is moving towards a knowledge-based, rather than 
manufacturing-based, industry. During the last decade both EU and U.S. have 
increased their R&D spending, especially for software development. This 
makes the accounting choices for these costs of great importance. Since the 
two markets use different accounting regulations, IFRS and US GAAP, it is of 
great interest to study if and why there are differences between the two 
standards’ treatment of software development costs. Although the similarities 
between the two standards are predominant, still we hypothesize that there 
are differences in how firms in the two regions account for their development 
costs for software.  
Research design: The hypotheses are investigated by comparing a sample 
of companies in the software industry for both EU and U.S. Hypotheses have 
been created and data has been gathered from the database Datastream. To 
analyze the data and see if the null hypothesis can be rejected, multiple 
statistical tests have been executed. Both non-parametric test as well as 
parametric tests has been utilized in this thesis. 
Conclusion: The thesis provides evidence that there is a difference in the 
propensity of capitalization of development costs in the software industry 
between EU and U.S. Moreover, it provides evidence that neither of the 
incentives age, turnover or total assets affect the amount capitalized. 
Furthermore, neither of the two target-beating variables affected 
capitalization of development costs. This can be due to the small sample 
tested. Only the variable US GAAP is an affecting factor on capitalization. This 
suggests that other factors, such as enforcement and differences between the 
markets, most certain influence the accounting choice for software 
development costs. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The importance of research and development (R&D) is increasing since the 
industry is becoming knowledge-based rather than manufacture-based. One 
region that understands the importance of this is the EU, which today is one 
of the leading markets in the world in the R&D sector. During the last decade, 
EU’s expenditure on R&D has grown by 43.5 percent that has increased their 
competitiveness in the world. However, EU plans to continue to increase their 
R&D investments and implemented an objective in 2010 to devote three 
percent of EU’s gathered GDP in R&D, named the Europe 2020 strategy. 
(Eurostat, 2012) This occurs despite the fact that that Europe is one of the 
regions that spends most amount of their R&D in relation to GDP than any 
other region in the world (The World Bank, 2013). 
Likewise, the U.S. is one of the leading markets of R&D. The number of 
software and information technology service companies exceeds 100 000 with 
a spending of over 126.3 billion dollars (2011) on R&D. This results in more 
than 55 percent of the global spending on R&D within information and 
communication technology (ICT). Their spending’s increased by 6.3 percent 
on R&D ICT (2011) and is expected to continue to grow. This makes the 
accounting standard, which regulates R&D investments, of great importance 
as the company’s finances can vary considerably when different accounting 
choices are made. (SelectUSA, 2013) Consequently, it is a current and 
interesting area to study more closely.  
In 1999, Microsoft stated that they were under investigation for their 
accounting practices by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
(Pulliam and Buckman, 2002) The investigation focused on the company's 
revenue deferral and what is called “unearned revenues” where hundreds of 
million of dollars were set aside for future earnings. The company partly 
smoothed their revenue by not directly recognizing the revenue due to future 
upgrades and services that were included when purchased software. 
Additionally, they did not capitalize the development costs of the software 
according to the Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) No 86, says SEC. The 
standard states that when internally developed software reaches the stage of 
“technological feasibility”, which is established upon completion of a detail 
program design, it shall be capitalized as an intangible asset. Since Microsoft 
is a major player in the market, especially in the software industry1, this gave 
wide publicity since many American software companies apply this standard 
according to Maffei (2000). Microsoft argued that "Research and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Software and computer service is a sector within the technology industry and technology 
supersector. The sector contains three sub sectors: computer services, Internet and software. 
These companies do services such as consulting related to information technology, computer 
system design, internet-related services, computer software development etc. (Industry 
Classification Benchmark, 2012)  !
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development costs are expensed as incurred. Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 86, accounting for the costs of computer 
software to be sold, leased, or otherwise marketed, does not materially affect 
the company." (Maffei, 2000) This makes the topic “software capitalization” 
interesting as a subject of research. 
Moreover, in the journal Business Week (2008) a journalist points out that 
SEC is thinking about adopting IFRS. This due to the fact that US GAAP is 
complex and outdated, along with having two different regulations which can 
lead to misleading information. Furthermore, it is stated that 63 percent of 
the multinational-companies reporting under both IFRS and US GAAP, show 
higher earnings using the international standards. (Henry, 2008) 
 
1.2 The accounting problem  
In 2005, EU adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and 
simultaneously IAS 38 Intangible assets were put in use (IFRS, 2013). This 
was the first comprehensive standard for intangible assets. According to the 
standard, it is not allowed to recognize research costs but development costs 
should be capitalized when they fulfills certain recognition criterias as, for 
example, “existence of future economic benefits” (IAS 38). 
In relation to IFRS, Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has since 
1973 regulated the standards for financial accounting in the U.S., US GAAP. 
Furthermore, SEC and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
recognized the standards as authoritative. In the middle of 2009, FASB 
reorganized the standards’ codification and implemented a new system. For 
example, FAS 86 was changed into ASC 895-202. (FASB, 2013) 
When following US GAAP, all R&D expenditures shall be charged as expenses 
when they occur, except for some categories. For example, assets related to 
internally generated computer software programs should be capitalized 
according to ASC 895-20 when “technological feasibility” can be established. 
The phrasing technological feasibility can be aligned with IAS 38 recognition 
criteria “future economic benefits” as they essentially have the same intention. 
Though IFRS and US GAAP are phrased in different ways the fundamental 
ideas are still the same. (EY, 2011) 
Although the two standards (IAS 38 and ASC 985-20) are in many aspects 
similar we still believe we will find a difference in the propensity capitalized 
development cost for software between EU and U.S. This may be inferred 
from Agoglia’s et al. (2011) study where the authors found that companies are 
inclined to capitalize lease to a greater extent when following IFRS rather than 
US GAAP. The accounting treatment for leasing according to the two 
standards is very similar. Likewise, software accounting is similar between the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!More information concerning the standards can be found under the section “Institutional 
settings”. !
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two standards as well, which makes us believe that the propensity of 
capitalization of software costs will differ as well.  
According to Ball (2006), the differences can in many cases be explained by 
endogenous factors (e.g. incentives and enforcement). Enforcements will not 
be tested in this thesis, instead incentives will be the focus as managers can be 
influenced when preparing the financial statements. For example, incentives 
concerning beating the targets, or lowering taxable profit will be taken into 
consideration. Also, reasons like the firms’ life-cycle, turnover and size may 
influence the accounting choice 3 . This can cause differences in the 
accounting.  Our aim is to investigate following hypotheses.  
H1: There is a difference in the propensity of capitalization of development 
cost for software between IFRS and US GAAP. 
H2: The difference is due to incentives, such as target-beating, turnover, 
company size and/or life-cycle. 
The hypotheses are described more thoroughly in chapter 5.  
1.3 Purpose 
Both IFRS and US GAAP allow capitalization of development costs for 
software. With regard to this, the purpose of this study is to examine following 
question. If there are any differences in the propensity of capitalization of 
development costs in the software industry between IFRS and US GAAP. Also, 
the aim of this thesis is to see if there are any reasons for accounting in a 
certain way. This is to examine whether or not the reasons affect the 
companies’ accounting choice, rather than the standard and the institutional 
setting in the country where the company is placed. Reasons that may affect 
the accounting choice can be endogenous factors such as incentives and 
enforcement. The reasons and incentive we will focus on in this study are 
turnover, life-cycle, the company’s size and target-beating.  
1.4 Limitations 
During this study we will use Datastream as a source for financial accounting 
data. The financial information that will be used in this study is from 2012. 
Moreover, the program only contains figures for listed companies and we have 
to rely on the data presented as being complete and correct. Hence, we will 
only study those companies that are presented in the database. 
1.5 Delimitations 
Both IFRS and US GAAP are widespread practiced and accepted accounting 
regulations. The study is delimited to companies within the software industry 
in EU and U.S. and compares their accounting standards. IFRS is not only !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!More information about incentives will be presented under chapter 3 “Earlier Research”. !
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adopted in Europe, it has also spread to other parts of the world, for example, 
to Oceania and Asia. This study, however, is delimited to listed companies in 
the EU, which consists of 28 member states. We will not include Croatia since 
they joined the EU during 2013 and accordingly did not have requirements to 
adopt IFRS before they joined. This results in 27 countries in the sample. As 
for US GAAP, only listed companies in the U.S. will be studied. The reasons 
for these delimitations are: first, EU and U.S. are similar in size and will 
therefore give a sufficient sample. Secondly, the EU has to follow IFRS 
according to the EU directives; hence, the utility of standards between the 
countries is similar (IFRS, 2013). 
 
Since this study uses Datastream as a database, it will only cover those 
companies that are classified as software companies in this database. 
Moreover, the development costs that occur in these companies are all 
collected together as R&D costs for software and are not further distinguished. 
Another delimitation is that we have decided to not focus on enforcement in 
this thesis, instead our main focus is incentives. 
 
1.6 Contribution 
With this thesis we would like to contribute with research about the current 
and increasingly important subject research and development. Since the 
industry is moving towards more knowledge-based, accounting choices for 
R&D are vital to give a faithful view of the companies’ financial statements. 
The subject is also current with regard to FASB's willingness to adopt IFRS. 
Furthermore, this thesis will contribute with the observation that there are 
different accounting choices made regarding research and development costs. 
This may be because of many different reasons, as we will present in this 
study.  
 
1.7 Outline 
This thesis will continue by describing the two different standards, IAS 38 and 
ASC 985-20, and their similarities under chapter 2 Institutional settings. 
Further on, chapter 3 will present the development of the hypotheses and the 
used literature. After that, the method will be described in chapter 4 Research 
design. Chapter 5 contains the empirical findings and analysis and in chapter 
6 conclusions will be presented. Finally, chapter 7 will discuss further 
research.  
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2. Institutional settings 
To account for development costs of software EU uses IFRS standard IAS 38, 
while U.S. uses FASB's standard ASC 985-20. These standards have many 
similarities, even though IAS 38 focus on all development costs, while ASC 
985-20 specifically focus on software development costs. Below will be 
examined how the two standards have developed their present content and 
investigates when software can be recognized as an intangible asset according 
to the two standards. 
2.1 IAS 38 - Software accounting in EU  
During the late 1990s the precaution to expense most of the parts of intangible 
assets were criticized. This was due to the fact that more and more companies 
increased their holdings of intangible assets, which they could not capitalize 
on in their balance sheet as an asset. The dominant precaution during that 
period made it difficult to recognize intangible assets on the balance sheet. 
Due to this, future return was more difficult to estimate than tangible assets. 
As an example, a company can easily estimate the return on a machine since 
usually the rate of production and the cost of the machine are well known. An 
intangible asset, however, is continually dependent on the staff of the 
company, and additionally it is important to keep in mind which opportunities 
they have to exploit it. This criticism decreased during 2000-2001 when 
several IT companies and technology companies fell sharply in market value, 
which again brought up the question of the consequences of capitalization. 
(Marton et al., 2013) 
Before IAS 38 was implemented, many of the intangible assets were 
categorized as goodwill under the standard IFRS 3. This came to an end in 
2005 when the new standard was implemented. IAS 38 aims at intangible 
assets, which are non-monetary assets without physical substance. (Marton et 
al., 2013) 
IAS 38 addresses a certain part of the standard to cover internally developed 
intangible assets and the development-phase of intangible assets. The 
standard divides internally developed intangible assets into two phases: the 
research phase and the development phase. (IAS 38, p. 52) Only the 
development phase can be recognized on the balance sheet. The requirements 
of IASB's conceptual framework is that all the following terms have to be 
fulfilled (IAS 38, p. 57): 
First, it must be technically feasible to complete the asset for future usage or 
to sell it. Also, the intention for the development of the asset is to complete, 
use or sell it. Moreover, the standard requires that there is a probable feasible 
future economic benefit for the asset and that the company has sufficient 
technical, financial and other resources required to complete the asset. Last, 
the company must be able to calculate the expenditure attribute to the 
intangible asset during its development in a reliable way. (IAS 38, p. 57, a-f) 
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What is shown above is if the asset is to be used only internally it must 
demonstrate usability (IAS 38, p. 57, d). When assessing whether an internally 
generated intangible asset qualifies for capitalization of internally generated 
intangible assets the precautionary principle4 is applied. The recognition of 
expenditure will only begin when the conditions are met. 
The company can also demonstrate future economic benefits by providing 
evidence that there is a market for the asset. These future economic benefits 
are based on the recoverable amount. To meet the requirements of 
completing, using and obtaining the future economic benefits of the developed 
product, a company must show a business plan or alternatively a loan-offer 
(IAS 38, p. 61). 
There are additional requirements that must be met in order to enable firms 
to recognize development costs. The company is required to be able to reliably 
calculate the costs directly attributed to the development of the intangible 
asset to allow recognition. These directly attributable costs are costs for 
materials and services, wages and employee benefits, costs of interest on 
loans, fees to register a legal right and the amortization of patents and licenses 
that are used to internally generate the intangible asset. The cost of internally 
generated intangible asset is thus the sum of the expenditure incurred (IAS 
38, p. 66). One should not, however, capitalize on the expenditure that had 
already been expensed (IAS 38, p. 71). 
2.2 ASC 985-20 - Software accounting in the U.S. 
In 1974, FASB released a new standard that for the first time described 
accounting practices for R&D activities. FAS 2 Accounting for research and 
development costs, states that all R&D costs shall be charged to expense when 
they incur (FAS 2, p. 12). In “Basis for conclusion” FAS 2, there are two main 
reasons for doing so. Firstly, the board believes that it is hard to reap the 
future benefits of research and development costs, as there is a high 
uncertainty factor involved. “..on average less than 2 percent of new product 
ideas and less than 15 percent of product development projects were 
commercially successful”. (FAS 2, p. 39) Secondly, the board was of the 
opinion that it is hard to estimate a direct correlation between R&D expenses 
and future benefits as well as the quantity of the revenue. (FAS 2, p. 41) 
Hence, all R&D costs shall be expensed. This way of treating accounting 
choice can be seen as extremely conservative method as well as precautionary. 
At the end of 1985, a new standard FAS 86 Accounting for the Costs of 
Computer Software to Be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed was 
announced. The standard deviated significantly from FAS 2 as it allows 
capitalizing development costs in some cases. The motive for this was that 
Accounting Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC) and SEC indicated that 
users interpreted FAS 2 differently. Because of this they requested a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The precautionary principle can be described as avoiding unnecessary risk-taking. In 
accounting it implies for example that companies evaluate the assets low and debts high. 
(Marton, 2013 & Smith, 2006) !
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clarification of accounting for internally generated computer software. (FAS 
86, p. 1) Moreover, in 2009 FASB replaced all former US GAAP standards and 
instead established a new improved single authoritative codification called 
FASB Accounting Standards Codification (ASC). (Williams et al., 2013) This 
lead to that FAS 86 Accounting for the Costs of Computer Software to Be 
Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed changed into ASC 985-20 Cost of 
software to be sold, leased or marketed. However, ASC 985 is the main 
standard for software accounting. There are also ASC 350-40 Internal use 
software and ASC 985-605 Software revenue recognition concerning 
accounting for software. 
In ASC 985-20 technological feasibility is an important term, as this is the 
turning point when a product can be capitalized or not. According to the 
standard, technological feasibility can be achieved when the company has 
performed certain activities. As a minimum, one of two actions has to be 
completed, either the company should have finished a detailed program 
design or if that is not possible, the company should at least have completed a 
product design and a working model. A company must ensure in their detailed 
program design that it has available the necessary skills, hardware and 
software technology to produce the product, its consistency with the product 
design by tracing and documentation, and must identify the high-risk 
development issues regarding the computer software and all the issues that 
may be encountered in the production of the software. However, if the process 
of creating a software program does not include a detailed program design, an 
enterprise must complete a program design and a working model. 
Additionally it must substitute the completeness of the working model and its 
consistency by testing it. (ACS 985-20-25-2, a-b) What is not to be capitalized 
is the computer system that improves an enterprise´s administrative or selling 
procedures are not considered R&D costs (ASC 985-20-25-5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Stages for accounting development costs for software.  
Costs for computer software to be sold, leased, or otherwise marketed, that 
incur before technological feasibility has been established, shall be expensed 
while all, cost subsequent technological feasibility, shall be capitalized (see 
picture above). In other words, in the beginning of a project all cost shall be 
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charged to expense until the company can prove technological feasibility. Only 
after that point can the development costs be capitalized. Furthermore, in 
985-20-25-6 it is stated that when the product is available for sale the 
capitalization should end. Also, maintenance cost and customer support cost 
shall be expensed when they occur. 
Furthermore, ASC 350-40 provides guidance for internal-use software, both 
purchased and internally developed. This kind of software is characterized by 
the fact that that is acquired, internally developed or modified solely to meet 
the entity’s internal requirements. However, it is also characterized by not 
having a substantive plan to market externally. What makes this standard 
different from ASC 985-20 is that software that is used in the production of a 
product or the provision for a service, but not acquired by the customer, 
should be accounted for under the guidance of this standard. The stages of 
when to start capitalize development cost for software are when the 
preliminary project staged is complete, the same as in ACS 985-20 (ASC 350-
40-25-2). However, the accounting treatment largely depends on the nature of 
the cost incurred when internal-use software is concerned. The costs during 
the application development, as well as conversion of old data by the new 
system should be capitalized (ASC 350-40-25-3). As follows, the company 
should cease to capitalize the software no later than when it is complete and 
ready for its intended use. After that, maintenance costs should be expensed 
as they occur (ASC 350-40-25-6). If the development of the internal use 
software is no longer likely to be completed, the software should be valued at 
its fair value, zero, since there is no use for the software. 
2.3 Similarities 
There are many similarities between IAS 38 and ASC 985-20. First and 
foremost, both accounting standards encourage “fair value accounting” which 
is incorporated when capitalizing development costs. Secondly, internally 
used software can be recognized on the balance sheet whichever standard is 
followed. Furthermore, both standards only allow capitalization of 
development costs and not research costs. Probably the most important 
similarity is that the two standards express their ways of recognizing 
development costs in different ways, but the fundamental ideas are basically 
the same.  
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3. Development of hypotheses 
3.1 Difference in capitalization 
3.1.1 Harmonization 
As the markets around the globe are rapidly connecting, the world is moving 
towards a more global economy. As a result the need for global accounting 
standards are increasing fast. Due to IFRS and US GAAPs differences, 
discussions have been during many years to harmonize and converge the two 
accounting systems into one global accounting system. (Fosbre et al., 2009) A 
reason for this discussion could be that in the repercussions of the multiple 
accounting scandals in 2002, the U.S. legislated a new accounting reform, The 
Sarbanes Oxley Act. To be able to prevent scandals in the future, the US 
Congress stated in this Act that they support harmonization of international 
accounting standards. (Soxlaw, 2006) 
As a result of this, IASB and FASB have throughout more than a decade 
worked together to achieve harmonization. In 2002, they signed the Norwalk 
Agreement as a start for the convergence project. (FASB, 2002) As of today, 
harmonization has still not been reached, which indicates that it is a difficult 
and strenuous process.  
3.1.2 Rules-based and principles-based 
Furthermore, there are multiple differences between standards created by 
IASB and FASB. The most noteworthy is that IFRS is principles-based while 
US GAAP is a rules-based regulation. According to Wüstemann and 
Wüstemann (2010) rules-based standards are difficult to evade as the purpose 
is described closely. On the other hand, a principles-based system, contains 
fewer guidelines and as a result demands more professional judgments. 
Furthermore, Agoglia et al. (2011) state that those that prepares financial 
statement are more likely to capitalize lease under principles-based standards 
than when applying a rules-based standard. Even though the leasing 
standards are similar, the propensity for capitalization varies. This implies 
that there is a distinct difference between the two types of accounting 
regulations that will affect how prepares report financial statements’ 
depending on which regulation the company follows. Moreover, the authors 
also examined the effect of audit committees. To be able to perform the test, 
researchers manipulated the standards so they would clearly distinguish 
between them. The result showed that when a strong audit committee was 
present in a rules-based setting, financial statements prepares were more 
likely to capitalize than with a weak audit committee. However, with a 
principles-based setting the audit committee did not have a noteworthy effect. 
3.1.3 Enforcements influence 
According to Ball (2006) major influences that can affect the outcome of the 
accounting are exogenous factors, in other words enforcers like analysts, 
auditors, boards, block shareholders, courts, politicians, rating agencies, 
!! 10!
regulators and the press. These prominent factors crucially influence financial 
statements prepares’ incentives which in turn shape the practices of financial 
reporting. Furthermore, the author states that these elements remain local, 
which leads to uneven IFRS enforcement and different accounting practices 
around the globe. 
As of today, nearly 100 countries have adopted IFRS around the globe. Ball 
(2006) believes that just by adopting IFRS will not lead to uniformity because 
of an uneven implementation and local enforcement setters. Instead, he states 
that it can mislead investors to believe in more uniformity than it actually is. 
International differences that might exist will instead be hidden under the 
uniform set of standards, IFRS. According to Ball (2006) the only way to 
actually accrediting IFRS with “high-quality” accounting and uniformity is to 
implement a worldwide enforcement mechanism. This mechanism should have 
the power to penalize countries that use IFRS as a brand-name when not 
following a certain practice.  
3.1.4 Foreign private issuers 
Furthermore, Plumlee and Plumlee (2008) examined a sample of 100 foreign 
private issuers (FPIs) that was from March 4, 2008, allowed not to provide 
reconciliation to US GAAP. The authors identified two major areas where the 
FPIs report differently. Firstly, they identified the category of pensions/other 
post-retirement benefits and secondly the category related to goodwill/other 
intangibles. These reporting’s are of interest for investors, academics and 
other actors that observe and use the financial information. This indicates that 
there is a difference in companies accounting choice between US GAAP and 
other accounting regulation, such as IFRS.  
In this study we examine the difference in the propensity of capitalization of 
development cost for software between the two regions, EU and U.S. The 
standards, IAS 38 and ASC 985-20, concerning development cost have more 
similarities than differences. However, we still believe that we can find a 
difference in the propensity capitalized. In this study we will not research 
enforcement (e.g. audit committee and regulators) further but instead focus 
on the incentives behind the accounting decisions for the companies.  
 
3.1.2 Hypothesis  
To be able to perform this study we have developed hypotheses. These are 
based on earlier research, which we would like to build upon and contribute 
to. We use a deductive method as theory is expounded and hypotheses are 
developed. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: There is a difference in the propensity of capitalization of development 
cost for software between IFRS and US GAAP. 
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3.2 Incentives influence 
3.2.1 Life-cycle 
Oswald and Zarowin (2007) found in their study that companies in their early 
life-cycle tend to capitalize more than mature companies. Due to their 
findings, we believe that the same result will be found when comparing EU 
companies that apply IFRS and U.S. companies that apply US GAAP 
concerning software. This because of the need of capital in the early period of 
a company’s life-cycle, where companies with higher amounts of assets more 
easily collect and borrow capital from banks and investors than those without. 
At the same time, more mature companies tend to expense more of the 
development costs due to lower their profit (to obtain lower tax) and the lower 
need of capital. Consequently, we believe that these factors do have an impact 
on the capitalization frequency, no matter when standard is applied. For the 
variable life-cycle it is the maturity of the company that needs to be measured. 
To do this we will use age as a proxy for the companies’ maturity and life-
cycle, as Oswald and Zarowin (2007) did in their article. This leads to the 
following hypothesis. 
H2A: There is a negative correlation between companies in the beginning of 
the life-cycle and capitalization of development costs. 
3.2.2 Target-beating 
Both Hayn (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) identify a “kink” in the 
earnings, where management avoids the negative numbers, as it is preferable 
for firms to have small positive numbers, zero or under. The market reacts 
strongly to negative numbers and for this managers try to avoid it. This is 
called the “target-beating theory”, where managers have incentives to beat 
targets. Moreover, they found that if incentives for target-beating exist, firms 
capitalize more. Since studies show that the most important item in the 
financial reports, according to analysts, investors, senior executives, and 
boards of directors, is earning. That is why it is the most important item 
concerning target-beating (Degorg et al. 1999). 
There are studies that prove an increasing pressure on management to beat-
targets (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Management tends to carry out 
repairs and maintenance in order to meet earnings’ expectations (Perry and 
Grinaker, 1994). When companies’ pre-management is facing a small loss, 
management tends to boost earnings to present small profit instead.  As a 
result, more companies present a small profit than a small loss, which leads to 
a “kink” in the earnings’ normal distribution curve when comparing 
companies. In figure 2, the “kink” shows that there are fewer companies than 
expected which have an annual small loss. This indicates that the companies 
try to beat the targets. Further, the authors provide evidence that companies 
with small profit tend to more discretionary accruals than small profit firms. 
This provides evidence that after removing earnings’ distribution, the “kink” 
should decline.    
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Figure 2 Histogram displaying the "kink". (Source Jacob and Jorgenson, 2007) 
 
With regard to target-beating and development costs, studies have found that 
firms may use R&D expenditures to beat targets. Osma and Young (2009) 
found in their study that companies who failed to meet earnings target one 
year, increased the probability to cut R&D expenditure for the next year. Their 
study also shows that the pressure to report positive earnings’ levels tends to 
increase managements cuts in R&D in order to meet targets. Furthermore, the 
authors also found that short-term target-beating influences UK firms, where 
long-term value creation is sacrificed by short-term goals. However, their 
study shows that high R&D intensity firms are less likely to cut their R&D 
expenditures. This is so in case of short-term earnings pressure when these 
investments will provide future value and yield revenue. As a result, we would 
like to study the relationship between target-beating and how it differs with 
respect to IFRS and US GAAP, concerning companies’ accounting practices 
for development costs in the software industry, by using target-beating as a 
variable. We believe it would be relevant for the hypothesis as also Cazavan-
Jeny et al. (2011) found that French companies capitalized more when target-
beating is involved.  Consequently, we would like to see if the theory is 
consistent in our case. We expect that company’s capitalization of R&D 
expenditures will be positively associated with target-beating. Which leads to 
the following hypothesis. 
H2B: There is a positive correlation between companies who target beats and 
capitalize development costs.   
3.2.3 Company size 
Aboody and Levs’ (1998) study which found that larger firms tend to spend 
more on basic research, maintenance and upgrades of their software. Since it 
was not, and is still not, permitted to capitalize these three stages of the 
software development when using the prevailing standard No. 86 (today 
called ASC 985-20), the result is that large companies expense more than 
small firms. Accordingly, small-size firms tend to capitalize more than large 
firms since they spend less on these three stages. Also, Cazavan-Jeny et al. 
(2011) studied companies in France and the managers’ decision to capitalize 
or expense R&D. The authors found that companies that capitalize R&D 
usually invest less in R&D and are also the firms that are smaller and more 
leveraged than companies that do not capitalize their R&D expenditures. 
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Equally, Oswald (2008) in his study examines how both size and profitability 
are associated with the amount of capitalization of development costs. He 
examines how “Expensers” report more positive earnings, and are also older 
than “Capitalizers”.  Consequently, there are reasons to believe that the firms’ 
size is correlated to the amount of capitalized development costs, where small 
firms capitalize more than large firms.   
To measure the size of the company total assets will be used as a proxy. The 
size of the company can be measured in various ways, which have been 
extensibly discussed in earlier literature. Erlingsson et al. (2012) states that 
total assets, net sales, and number of employees are commonly used measures 
for firm’s size. Other researchers confirm these findings and beyond these 
three proxies supplement with an additional, the value of equity (Huff et al., 
1999). For example, the seminal work of Gibrat (1931) showed that measuring 
firm size by the number of employees indicates a right skewed distribution. As 
the software industry is more knowledge-based rather than manufacturing-
based, the proxy total asset is more appropriate than for example number of 
employees. Hence, we believe that companies’ size has a negative correlation 
to the frequency of capitalization. From this the following hypothesis can be 
developed. 
H2C: There is a negative correlation between larger companies and 
capitalization of development costs. 
3.2.4 Turnover 
Oswalds and Zarowins’ (2007) study shows how early life-cycle firms 
capitalizes more R&D costs than mature companies. Since the mature 
companies normally have a greater turnover than early life-cycle firms, we 
believe there is a parallel not just to the firms’ development stage, but also to 
their turnover size. Moreover, studies show that those companies who invest 
more in R&D tend to expense more than others (Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011). 
With this in mind, larger companies have more financial strength to invest in 
R&D, and accordingly greater turnover. Thus, when companies have a greater 
turnover, they expense more development costs and vice versa. This is a result 
of the willingness to keep the profit low to lower the company’s income taxes. 
Additionally the company has enough financial strength to expense the 
development costs rather than capitalize them. Therefore, we believe that 
there is a negative connection between turnover and capitalizing development 
costs for software. Which leads to the following hypothesis.  
H2D: There is a negative correlation between turnover and capitalize 
development costs. 
Above mentioned hypotheses (2A-2D) will be tested together to examine 
whether or not there are correlations between different reasons and the 
proportion capitalized development costs in the software industry.  
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4. Research design 
4.1 Choice of method 
This thesis examines whether there is a difference between IFRS and US 
GAAP, concerning software accounting. To execute this research thoroughly, 
the study is conducted with a quantitative approach. Furthermore, this study 
examines data from companies in the software industry during the financial 
year 2012. For this study, the data has been collected from the database 
Datastream. 
4.2 Statistical tests 
To execute this quantitative study a statistical approach has been used and 
therefore statistical tests are executed to try to answer the hypotheses that 
have been developed. To test the hypotheses multiple regression analyses are 
executed in Stata.  
4.2.1 First hypothesis 
The first hypothesis is tested in two ways. First and foremost, a probit 
regression has been performed, which is a parametric test. This type of 
regression is suitable as the dependent variable is binary (capitalize or not). A 
probit regressions purpose is to estimate the probability that an observation 
will end up in one category. In this case, the observations will fall into four 
“corners ” as both variables are binary. To interpret and analyze the coefficient 
of the probit regression the command “margins” has been used in Stata. The 
marginal effect of the independent variables is interpreted, which is how much 
the conditional probability of the outcome variable changes the value of a 
variable. This by holding all the other regressors constant. (Aldrich, J. H. and 
Nelson, F. D., 1984) 
Secondly, a chi-square test is used to verify if it leads to the same results as in 
the probit regression and test the first hypothesis. This is opposite to a probit 
regression a non-parametric test, which indicates in which categories the 
observations fall into. Both these methods are suitable as the dependent and 
the independent variables are binary. Also, the tests are useful as the model is 
nonlinear. (Corthinas, C. and Black, K., 2012) 
4.2.2 Second hypothesis 
For the second hypothesis a probit regression has been executed.  The 
dependent variable is binary in the probit regression. The same variable is 
used in the first hypothesis, that is to say whether the company capitalizes or 
not.  
Also, a multiple linear regression is conducted to ensure same results. A 
multiple linear regression is suitable as there are more than one explanatory 
variable. In the multiple linear regressions the dependent variable shows the 
proportion capitalized in relation to R&D outlays.  
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4.3 Data collection 
The data presented and used in this thesis was gathered through the database 
Datastream. Only companies that are listed on a stock exchange in the United 
States are incorporated in this study. Further, the sample is reduced to 
companies that produce software and computer services. This creates our 
sample for the U.S. Following, the same procedure are done on listed software 
companies in EU to produce a similar sized sample. All countries in the EU 
are included except from Croatia, which in 2012 was not a member of the EU. 
Below in appendix 1, the sample companies are presented. Before data was 
gathered the sample companies were filtered for which accounting regulation 
they followed. 
When data was gathered in Datastream it was salient that some of the 
variables had a great amount of “error” in the data. To be able to guarantee 
that the data was correct and that in fact “error” could be set to zero or 
“missing value” we verified a random sample by comparing the result to the 
companies’ annual reports. This indicated that the data was presented 
correctly and “error” did in fact mean that the company had not that type of 
variable and it could be set to zero for the variables Capitalize (WC18299), 
Expense (WC01201) and Total assets (WC02999). Furthermore, we 
transformed all the monetary variables to Euro.  
4.4 Potential problems 
Problems that may arise when collecting data have primarily to do with 
demarcation of companies that are software companies. There may also be 
difficulties regarding the capitalization on explicitly software development 
compared to other development costs. In US GAAP the development costs for 
software that can be capitalized are more distinct. However, IFRS are not as 
specific about which development costs can be recognized on the balance 
sheet. This can make it difficult to differentiate which of the development 
projects costs are capitalized rather than expensed. Further on, this means 
that the results can vary depending on how detailed the various income 
statement and balance sheets are. Furthermore, in the case of the situation 
not all companies report explicitly about which parts of their development 
costs are related to the development of software, since this study only focuses 
on those companies that do. 
4.5 Sample size 
At first, the total sample obtained from Datastream was 554 software 
companies in the EU respectively 797 in the U.S. This study only covers 
companies that have either capitalized or expensed development costs or 
both. Companies that did not have any development outlays5 have been 
excluded. Therefore, the sample diminished to 209 software companies in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 In this thesis we define R&D outlays as both R&D expense as well as R&D assets. !
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EU and 281 in the U.S. The list of sample companies used in this thesis can be 
found in Appendix 1. 
4.6 Variables 
Independent 
variables 
Name Description 
WC18272 Company Founded Date when company was founded 
WC01001 Net Sales/Revenues Gross sales and other operating revenue 
less discounts, returns & allowances 
WC02999 Total assets Represent the total assets of the 
company  
EPS EPS Earnings per share 
EPS1FD12 Forecasted EPS IBES (Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System) 
WC01751 Net income Net income (also used to calculate EPS) 
INC1FD12 Forecasted Net Income IBES (Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System) 
 
Dependent 
variables 
Name Description 
WC18299 Capitalization of computer 
software 
Represent the capitalized costs of 
computer software under development. 
This item is updated when computer 
software is included within other 
intangible assets, not within property, 
plant & equipment. 
WC01201 Expense of R&D Contains expense of software costs 
 
In this section the different variables used in this thesis are presented. In the 
section “Development of hypotheses” the variables are well presented and 
motivated from a literature angle, but here they will be explained further and 
how they are defined in Datastream. 
As a starting point the two variables “WC01201 Expense of research and 
development cost”, and “WC18299 Capitalization of computer software” have 
been used. The variable “WC01201 Expense of research and development 
cost” contains expense of software cost according to the description in 
Datastream and as the software industry has been examined the major part 
are assumed to consists of this type of expense. These two are compared with 
each other to be able to see in general if there is a difference between how 
much is capitalized, the result are presented in section 5.1. The sample 
consists of software companies that capitalize or expense their R&D or both. 
Therefore, companies that had not capitalized or expensed any R&D outlays 
are eliminated. 
For the first hypothesis a probit regression and chi-square test is executed, 
which consist of two variables, one dependent and one independent. The 
dependent variable used is “WC18299 Capitalization of computer software” 
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while the independent variable is if the companies use US GAAP as an 
accounting standard. 
Moreover, the second hypotheses consist of four different parts, hypothesis 
2A-2D which is tested in different ways. In this study five different 
independent variables have been chosen to examine if it affects the company’s 
decision to capitalize. These are: 
• Life-cycle - To measure life-cycle age is used as a proxy. This is 
calculated by using the variable WC18272 Company founded, 2012 is 
used as the base year. 
• Turnover - The variable WC01001 Net Sales/Revenues is gathered to 
represent turnover.  
• Size - The company's size is measured using the proxy WC07230 Total 
Assets. 
• US GAAP - This is a binary variable. The companies are denoted 1 if 
they use US GAAP otherwise 0 when using IFRS.  
• Target-beating - This binary variable is measured in two different 
ways. Target beating 1 (TB1) is measured by using the variable EPS and 
EPS1FD12 Forecasted EPS while target-beating 2 (TB2) is measured by 
using WC01751 Net Income and INC1FD12 Forecasted Net Income. 
Furthermore, the forecasted measures are created by Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (IBES), which have been gathered through 
Datastream. 
4.6.1 Target beating measure 
To measure target-beating it is transformed to a binary variable, 1 if the 
company target beats and 0 otherwise. This is done by comparing the 
company’s expected EPS with the real EPS and if the real EPS beats the target 
with 10 percent or less they are classified as a target-beating company (TB1).  
Another method of measuring target-beating used in this thesis is by 
comparing the expected earnings with the real earnings, to see if the 
difference is equal to or greater than the amount of development cost for 
software. If so, the company is classified as a target-beating company, since 
they can manipulate the result to meet the targets. This variable is called TB2. 
Both methods are suitable as they have been used previously by other 
researchers (e.g. Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011 and Osma & Young, 2009). As 
target-beating can be measured in multiple ways the second hypothesis are 
tested in two different ways in consideration of the two different measures 
that have been chosen for target-beating. 
4.6.2 Controlling for outliers 
By observing the variable total assets it can be seen that it contains extreme 
values.  If not corrected for, these outliers can distort estimates of the 
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regression coefficients. To correct for outliers in this case the natural 
logarithm has been used, as a result the variable is normal distributed. This is 
a common way of treating extreme values in the variable total assets. (Ahmed 
& Falk, 2006. Erlingsson et al., 2012. Hamberg et al., 2011)  
Furthermore, the second variable turnover is similarly corrected for outliers. 
Instead of using the natural logarithm the variable is “winsorized” at one 
percent. Likewise, the variable age is winsorized at the one percent level as it 
is a continuous variable. (Hamberg et al., 2011) 
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5. Empirical findings and analysis 
5.1 Comparison between USA and EU 
 
Following hypothesis is investigated to see if the propensity of development 
costs for software between EU and the U.S. differ. First the amount capitalized 
and expensed development costs are displayed in a general view. After that, 
the first hypothesis is tested by performing multiple statistical tests.  
 
H1: There is a difference in the propensity of capitalization of development 
cost for software between IFRS and US GAAP. 
 
Below, the graph shows the propensity of capitalization and expense of 
software costs. The sample consists of companies in EU and U.S. that either 
capitalize or expense software costs. 
 
 
Graph 1 Comparison EU and U.S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown above, companies in EU, which follow IFRS, capitalize to a further 
extent than in the U.S. In EU 47 percent capitalize to some extent while in the 
U.S. only 24 percent do so. However, 53 percent of those who account 
software costs expense their costs in EU, while 76 percent are expensed in the 
U.S. 
 
This indicates that EU companies capitalize their development costs for 
software to a further extent than U.S. companies.  
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5.2 Propensity of capitalization 
To be able to examine our first hypothesis and confirm what is visually 
observed in the graph, statistical tests have been performed and are presented 
below. The first hypothesis is tested in two different ways. First with a 
parametric test, which is done with a probit regression that is suitable as the 
dependent variable is binary. Secondly, with a chi-square test which is a non-
parametric test. 
Capitalize (binary)= US GAAP (binary) 
 
5.2.1 Probit regression 
 
Below, the result from the probit regression is displayed. 
Table 1 Probit regression 
   
EQUATION VARIABLES Regression 1 
   
capitalizebinary usgaap -0.809*** 
  (0.000) 
   
 Observations 490 
pval in paratheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The table above shows that it is statistically proven that the null hypothesis 
can be rejected, as the p-value is less than the alfa level 1 percent. As a result 
the alternative hypotheses is true. There is a difference in the propensity of 
capitalization of development cost in the software industry between IFRS and 
US GAAP. 
 
To be able to analyze and interpret the coefficient of the probit regression the 
marginal effects is computed in Stata at the x-value 0 and 1. Two observations 
are tested as the variables are binary.  The following results are obtained. 
 
Table 2 Margins table 
 Margins (dy/dx) P-val  
US GAAP = 0 -0.311906 0.0000***  
US GAAP = 1 -0.2776898 0.0000***  
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The regression shows significant result, which is aligned with above showed 
results. The marginal effect is around -0.3, which implies that US GAAP firms 
have with 30% less probability capitalized rather than expensed their software 
costs. 
!! 21!
 
5.2.2 Chi-square test 
To secure the reliability in the above mentioned probit regression, a chi-
square test is performed. This is a non-parametric test on the same 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 3 Cross-table 
 
       Capitalize  
  0 1 Total 
US GAAP 0 83 126 209 
 1 199 82 281 
Total  282 208 490 
 
 
Table 4 Chi-Square test 
 Value P-val 
Pearson Chi-Square 47,469*** 0.000*** 
N of Valid Cases 490  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5 Phi Chi-square test 
 Value P-val 
Phi -0.311*** 0.000*** 
N of Valid Cases 490  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
A chi-square test indicates if there is a relation between the variables, rather 
than how strong it is. As presented above, the p-value is less than the alfa level 
1%. Because of this the null hypothesis can be rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis can be accepted. Consequently, there is a difference in the 
propensity capitalized development costs in the software industry between the 
regions.  
Furthermore, as it is a 2-by-2 table Phi can also be interpreted. The value 
presented in table 5 shows the size of the effect that the variable US GAAP 
have on whether the company capitalize or not. This results in -0.311, which is 
a moderate negative effect on capitalization. It is statistical significant as the 
p-value is less than the alfa level 1%. 
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The results from the chi-square test is aligned with earlier results, that there is 
a difference in the propensity capitalized development costs between IFRS 
and US GAAP. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected. This secures our 
earlier findings and increases its trustworthiness.  
As Agoglia et al. (2011) has shown earlier, the propensity of capitalization of 
leasing for rules-based standards is lower compared to principles-based 
standards. In his study, leasing was interpreted as these are very similar 
standards between IFRS and US GAAP. In this study capitalization of software 
development costs is compared with regards the two standards. Since the 
accounting regulations for software costs are also very similar with respect to 
the two standards the same results, aligned with Agoglia et al. (2011), are 
shown here. This means that even though the two standards in very similar 
ways regulate accounting for development costs for software, listed firms in 
the EU are more likely to capitalize than firms in the U.S.  
5.3 Incentives influence on capitalization 
As the first hypothesis is true, the null hypothesis can be rejected and as a 
result there is a difference in the propensity for capitalization of development 
costs between the two regions. This thesis will continue by examining what 
could be the reasons for the difference. The main focus will be on five different 
reasons that will be analyzed in two ways. First with a probit regression and 
secondly with a multiple linear regression to see if there is a correlation. 
Following hypotheses will be tested: 
H2A: There is a negative correlation between companies in the beginning of 
the life-cycle and capitalization of development costs. 
H2B: There is a positive correlation between companies who target beats and 
capitalize development costs.   
H2C: There is a negative correlation between larger companies and 
capitalization of development costs. 
H2D: There is a negative correlation between turnover and capitalize 
development costs. 
The fifth and last variable that will be incorporated in the following tests is if 
the company use US GAAP or not. 
5.3.1 Separate and correlation table 
First the five variables are tested separately. This to see if they were significant 
when no other variables were included in the regression. When the variables 
are tested separately it becomes clear how they affect the capitalization of 
software costs and correlate to each other, which can be seen in the 
correlation table below. Also, table 7 shows how much capitalization of 
development costs in the software industry increases or decreases with one 
more unit of each variable. 
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Table 6 Correlation table 
 Proportioncap w1age w1turnover logtotalassetcap usgaap TB1 TB2 
Proportioncap 1.0000       
w1age 0.0694 1.0000      
w1turnover 0.0602 0.1467 1.0000     
logtotalassetcap 0.1371 0.1883 0.4836 1.0000    
usgaap -0.3512 -0.1451 0.0793 -0.3568 1.0000   
TB1 -0.0721 0.0554 -0.0271 -0.0047 -0.0862 1.0000  
TB2 -0.0412 -0.1541 -0.0466 -0.0349 -0.0215 -0.0866 1.0000 
 
 
The correlation table above indicates how the variables correlates with each 
other. Noteworthy is a clear correlation between turnover and total assets. 
This is not surprising as both in some ways represent the size of the company. 
A minor correlation can be observed between US GAAP and total asset. 
However, it is not sufficiently strong to explain a significant value in US 
GAAP.  
Table 7 Separate regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Age Turnover Total Assets US GAAP TB1 TB2 
       
w1age 0.002 - - - - - 
 (0.149)      
w1turnover - 0.000 - - - - 
  (0.221)     
Logtotalassetcap - - 0.026*** - - - 
   (0.002)    
USGAAP - - - -0.273*** - - 
    (0.000)   
TB1 - - - - -0.129 - 
     (0.289)  
TB2 - - - - - -0.057 
      (0.533) 
       
Observations 434 416 490 490 218 232 
R-squared 0.005 0.004 0.019 0.123 0.005 0.002 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In the table above each variable was tested separately in relation to the 
proportion capitalized. When Age was tested it showed a p-value of 0.149, 
which displays that this variable is not significant at any of 0.01, 0.05 or 0.1 
alfa level. The coefficient is 0.002 which means that for every one year’s 
increase in the companies age, the capitalization increases by 0.002. The 
coefficient is positive, which is opposite of what was expected.  
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The second variable turnover showed a p-value of 0.221 which indicates that 
this variable is not significant at any of the alfa levels. The coefficient for 
turnover is 0.000, which indicates that turnover does not affect capitalization 
of development costs. We believed it would show a negative correlation but 
here it showed no such results.  
The third variable total assets have a p-value of 0.085, which indicates that 
this variable is statistically significant at 10 percent alfa level. The variable has 
a positive coefficient of 0.012. However, in the beginning the correlation was 
hypothesized to be negative. This result provides evidence of the opposite.  
The US GAAP variable is a binary variable. The variable is significant at alfa 
level 1 percent. The coefficient is negative which indicates that the proportion 
capitalized is greater when using IFRS than US GAAP. This is aligned with the 
results found in hypothesis one, where the coefficient is also negative and also 
with our expected theory.  
Lastly, both the target-beating variables have no significance since the p-value 
vastly overshoots the significance level of 10 percent. They are not statistically 
significant in the regressions when they are tested on their own.  
5.3.2 Probit regression 
 
Capitalize (binary) = Size (total assets) + Turnover + Maturity (company founded) + US 
GAAP (binary) + Target-beating (binary) 
 
In the following section three probit regressions have been conducted. The 
results have been summarized in table 8 that can be found below. In all three 
regressions “Capitalize” have been used as the dependent variable whereas the 
independent variables differ among the regressions. Capitalization of 
development costs is measured as a binary variable, 1 if the company 
capitalizes 0 otherwise. 
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Table 8 Probit regression 
     
EQUATION VARIABLES Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
     
Capitalizebinary w1age 0.001 -0.003 0.005 
  (0.893) (0.667) (0.449) 
 w1turnover 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
  (0.306) (0.545) (0.075) 
 Logtotalassetcap -0.186 0.001 -0.086 
  (0.266) (0.994) (0.138) 
 USGAAP -0.777*** -0.808*** -0.950*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 TB1 -0.688*   
  (0.087)   
 TB2  0.147  
   (0.609)  
     
 Observations 210 222 374 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In the first regression, as seen above, it is only two of the variables that show 
significant results; US GAAP and TB1. The coefficient for both of the variables 
indicates a negative slope. The other variable has a p-value that is high above 
the alfa level of 10 percent.  
 
In the second regression the hypotheses was tested with TB2. In this probit 
regression only US GAAP was significant and has a p-value that is less than 
the alfa level 1%. This is aligned with the results obtained in the first 
hypothesis. In contrast to the first regression target-beating is no longer 
significant. 
Furthermore, in the third regression the variables were tested without the 
target-beating variable as it indicates different results in the two first 
regression. Also, this was done to increase the number of observations for the 
last regression. Similar to the first two regressions US GAAP shows significant 
results. In all three regressions US GAAP indicates strong significant results 
with a p-value less than the alfa level of 1%. 
 
To be able to interpret the probability of a change in the independent 
variables the marginal effect of the variables was established in Stata. The 
results for every variable are presented on the next page. 
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Table 8 Margins 
    
VARIABLES Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
    
W1age 0.000 -0.001 0.002 
    
W1turnover 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
logtotalassets -0.067 0.001 -0.030 
    
usgaap -0.2861 -0.3051 -0.3531 
 -0.2812 -0,2852 -0,3162 
tb1 -0.2501   
 -0.2142   
tb2  0.0551  
  0.0542  
    
Observations 210 222 374 
x=01, x=12 
 
In the table above, the marginal effects on each of the variables are presented. 
Noticeable, is that the marginal effect for US GAAP is almost the same 
throughout the three regressions, around -0.3. This indicates that when the 
company starts to follow US GAAP it leads to a 30 percent decreased 
probability that the company capitalize rather than expense their development 
costs for software.  
 
For the variable TB1 the marginal effect has a value of -0.286. This means that 
when companies target beats there is a 28.6 percent decreased probability 
that the company capitalize.  
 
Furthermore, for the other variables the marginal effect is zero or close to 
zero, which indicates that, there is no probability that it will affect the 
capitalization. 
 
5.3.2.1 Number of observations 
The number of observation increased between the first and second regression 
from 210 to 222. This is due to that variable TB 2 contains more samples in 
relation to TB 1. Since target-beating excluded many samples because of 
difficulties in measuring, regression 3 obtained the biggest sample (374). 
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5.3.3 Multiple Linear Regression 
 
Proportion capitalized = Size (total assets) + Turnover + Maturity (company founded) + 
Target-beating (binary) + US GAAP (binary) 
 
In the following section three multiple linear regressions were conducted. The 
results have been summarized in table 9 that can be found below. In all three 
regressions “Capitalize” has been used as the dependent variable whereas the 
independent variables differ among the regressions. The capitalization of 
development costs is measured as a proportion of the R&D outlays. This is 
done by dividing capitalization of development costs with R&D outlays. By 
this, the relation to total R&D outlays is presented instead of the amount 
capitalized. The analysis of each regression can be seen below.  
Table 9 Multiple linear regression 
    
VARIABLES Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
    
w1Age -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.973) (0.575) (0.596) 
w1turnover -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.982) (0.982) (0.123) 
LogTotalAssetsCap 0.045 0.038 -0.002 
 (0.368) (0.498) (0.899) 
USGAAP -0.282*** -0.287*** -0.292*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TB1 -0.184   
 (0.117)   
TB2  -0.074  
  (0.405)  
    
Observations 210 222 374 
R-squared 0.110 0.105 0.146 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
As shown in the table above, four of the five variables in regression one have a 
high p-value, which does not make them significant at any alfa level. Only the 
US GAAP variable is significant, which is aligned with both earlier results and 
literature. This verifies our earlier results that US GAAP influences how 
companies account for their development costs.  
In the second regression all the variables are tested with target-beating 
number two. Similar to the first regression, only the variable US GAAP is 
significant. Likewise, the other variables are not significant at any alfa level. 
In the third regression neither of the two target-beating variables were 
included, only the variables Age, Turnover, Total assets and US GAAP. The 
two target-beating variables had no significant effect on the proportion of 
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capitalization for software costs, since their p-value vastly overshoot the 
significant level. Due to this they were excluded from regression three to 
interpret the effect capitalization of development costs in the software 
industry without target-beating. Since not many companies are classified as 
target-beating companies it is a complex variable to measure.  Also, when 
assessing which companies that are target-beating companies it resulted in a 
low outcome. This could be a reason as to why the target-beating variable is 
not significant at any level in our model. Other researchers (Osma & Young, 
2009. and Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011) have examined a much greater sample 
when studying target-beating while this study is focused on a much smaller 
area. We believe that to obtain a statistical significant measure for target-
beating the sample has to be of much greater size than used in this study. 
5.3.3.1 Number of observations 
The number of observations increased from 207 to 209 between regression 1 
and 2. This is due to the fact that variable TB 2 contains more samples in 
relation to TB 1. Since target-beating excluded many samples because of 
difficulties in measuring, regression three obtained the biggest sample (353) 
compared to the other regressions. This was 72.04 percent of the total sample 
companies.  
5.3.3.2 R-square 
The value of R-square shows how well the regression can explain the variation 
in capitalization. In this case, the R-square in the first regression is 11.6 
percent, which indicates a low explanatory power. However, this is not an 
important measure in our case, as this study is not trying to find the perfect 
model. In the second regression table 9 shows that even in this regression R-
square is still low, 11.3 percent. Furthermore, the R-square value for 
regression three was 16.2 percent. This indicates that the explanation power 
for the regression is quite low, even compared to regression one and two. The 
number of observations in the last regression is greater which can be an 
explanation to the increased explanatory power in R-square.  
5.3.4 US GAAP significance 
As the results indicate, only US GAAP is significant in all three regressions in 
both the probit and multiple linear (total of six regressions). This makes us 
believe that incentives are not a major influencing factor for capitalized 
development costs for software. Instead we believe that there are other 
influencing factors that affect the capitalization of development costs in the 
software industry.  
Furthermore, the variable US GAAP shows a strongly negative significant 
coefficient, which is what was hypothesized in the beginning. That is to say, 
companies in the EU are more likely to capitalize than companies in the U.S. 
Possible reasons for this result will be discussed below. 
The two different standards in the EU and U.S. have been discussed earlier. As 
mentioned they have many similarities and we do not believe the differences 
in capitalization is due to the shaping of the standards. Instead the differences 
must be due to other circumstances. 
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Why only the variable US GAAP is significant may be due to many reasons. It 
is essential to mention that in this study almost all American companies use 
US GAAP as an accounting standard, even though US GAAP can be used in 
other markets as well. Likewise, the majority of companies that used IFRS in 
this study are in EU. Because the standards are very similar, this makes the 
study more focused on the markets rather than the standards. In Balls (2006) 
study, only one market was investigated which is different from this thesis. 
Consequently, it enhances the possibility that affecting factors, such as 
enforcement, is significant and influences the accounting choice for software 
development costs. Since the monitoring authority structure between the two 
markets that this thesis investigates is different, the accounting standard is 
probably not the critical factor. The enforcement factors are seemingly of 
greater relevance than the slight expression differences between the two 
standards.  
5.3.4.1 Differences between regions 
As mentioned, US GAAP is the only variable that shows significant results. 
The variable US GAAP represents not only the followed standard but also U.S. 
as a country. This means that one reason for the difference in capitalization of 
development costs in the software industry are due to the differences between 
the markets. For instance, this could be cultural difference between the two 
markets EU and U.S.  
Moreover, other significant differences between the two regions that can affect 
the capitalization of development costs in software are owner structure and 
corporate governance. Earlier research (Enriques and Volpin, 2007) has 
shown that the owner structure in continental Europe (France, Germany, 
Italy) traditionally differs from the U.S. The two most noteworthy differences 
are that firstly European companies have fewer and more controlling 
shareholders than in the U.S. This by more family owned companies and more 
concentrated owner structure. Secondly, the self-dealing regulation has 
traditionally been stricter in the U.S., which is when value is transferred from 
firms where the controlling shareholder owns a fraction of the cash-flow 
rights. These factors influence the corporate governance, since there are 
interest conflicts between shareholders and management. This in turn may 
influence the capitalization of development costs for software, since there are 
different parties to satisfy when accounting for development costs. (Enriques 
and Volpin, 2007) 
Furthermore, Enriques and Volpin (2007) found that on average, family-
controlled U.S. firms are better managed than widely held ones. This is 
verified by Barontini and Caprio (2005) who investigated the same question 
in European firms. Family-owned firms used assets more efficiently, which 
indicates a greater value of the assets than used inefficiently. Since more 
companies in EU are family-owned and/or with fewer owners, they may 
capitalize more assets since they use them more efficiently. 
This study provides evidence that EU companies capitalize more than U.S. 
companies, which is aligned with Agoglia et al.’s (2011) earlier findings. The 
coefficients are negative, which indicates that more firms capitalize when 
using IFRS. Another explanation for this result could be that Microsoft, which 
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expenses the majority of their R&D outlays, could be a trend setter for smaller 
firms and actors in the software industry. By this, they set the norm for other 
companies in the U.S. to follow.  
5.3.5 Enforcement 
Moreover, as Ball (2006) indicated enforcement can be of great importance 
for firms’ accounting choice. In the U.S. there is one controlling authority, 
SEC, which controls the whole market whereas in the EU there are different 
authorities in every country. As U.S. has one controlling mechanism it is more 
regulated and therefore more controlled. For IFRS where the controlling 
organ is on national level it is hard to obtain the same level of control and 
standard in every country. We believe this could be a main influencing factor 
on how firms account development costs in the software industry.  
Furthermore, the markets are similar in size as well as the number of 
observations between the two markets. More, this study only examine one 
sector; the software and computer services. This means that the incentives 
investigated could still have an influence in other sectors. Besides, separately 
they might affect other sectors but when tested together there is no such 
evidence.  
5.3.6 Other incentives 
This thesis focused on the incentives that in our opinion would lead to most 
influence on the capitalization choice. As this thesis could not provide 
evidence that these incentives were significant, there are other factors that 
influence the capitalizations choice instead. Other incentives that may affect 
the accounting choice are management earnings, solidity, bonus systems, 
leverage and principal agent theory, which may affect the capitalization for 
development costs in software.  
5.3.7 Not significant variables 
There are several non significant variables in the regressions. For example, the 
variable age is not significant in any of the regressions. This result is not 
aligned with Oswald and Zarowin’s (2007) earlier findings. However, their 
study only investigate one market whereas this thesis examines two different 
markets, EU and U.S. Furthermore, Oswald and Zarowin (2007) examined 
multiple sectors whereas this study only focus on one, the software and 
computer services sector. Incentives could vary among the countries and 
sectors depending on which accounting outcome is most suitable.  
Turnover is likewise not a significant variable. This might be because that 
many investors have a positive approach for expensing development costs 
rather than capitalizing. As a result, there could be a risk that important 
investments are missed without external financing if the company capitalizes 
their development costs.  
Furthermore, in contrast to Cazavan-Jeny et al.’s (2011) study the size of the 
company is not a significant variable in this study. However, in four of six 
regressions does the coefficient for age indicate a negative slope, which is what 
we hypothesized in the beginning and aligned with earlier research (Aboody & 
Lev, 1998 and Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011 and Oswald, 2008). That is to say, 
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smaller companies tend to capitalize development costs for software to a 
further extent than larger companies. A reason for this could be that larger 
companies spend more on research and maintenance, which is not allowed to 
capitalize.  
The variable target-beating shows significant result in one of four regressions. 
We do not believe this provides sufficient evidence that target-beating effect 
the capitalization of development costs for software. However, this study has a 
limited amount of observations where only a few target-beating companies are 
found. This could be a reason for not providing significant results.  
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6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to examine if there are any differences in the 
propensity for capitalization of development costs for software with respect to 
IFRS and US GAAP. Also, the study analyzes the question whether there are 
any reasons for accounting way. We have done this by observing companies’ 
financial accounting from 2012 in the software industry in EU and U.S.  
     
The hypotheses that this study intend to answer are the following: 
 
H1: There is a difference in the propensity of capitalization of development 
cost for software between IFRS and US GAAP. 
H2: The difference is due to incentives, such as target-beating, turnover, 
company size and/or life-cycle. 
The statistical tests of the first hypothesis provided evidence that there is a 
difference in the propensity for capitalization of development costs for 
software between EU and U.S. Both the probit regression and the chi-square 
test provide evidence that the null hypothesis can be rejected. This is aligned 
with earlier research and their results. Thereby, this study enhances the 
credibility that there is a difference in the propensity for capitalization for 
development costs for software between the two standards. That is to say, EU 
companies capitalize development costs for software to a further extent than 
U.S. companies. 
 
Furthermore, the statistical tests of the second hypothesis provide evidence 
that neither of the variables age, turnover or size affects the amount 
capitalized development costs throughout all the regressions. This result is not 
aligned with any of the earlier researchers results mentioned. However, earlier 
research has only tested one market, whereas this study tested two markets 
with two accounting standards. This makes the incentives less significant and 
enforcement and the difference between the markets more crucial.  
 
The target-beating variable showed significant results in one of four 
regressions, which were not expected at all as many researchers have found 
evidence for this theory earlier. Though, the insufficient evidence may be due 
to the limited sample used in this thesis. To obtain a statistical significant 
result the sample size would probably have had to be extended further. 
However, when target-beating is tested, none of the other variables do affect 
capitalization more than without the target-beating variables. 
 
This study has shown that these are probably not the only factors that affect 
capitalization of development costs. Only one variable do affect capitalization 
of development costs in software in all six regressions in this thesis, this is US 
GAAP. This indicates that other factors, such as enforcement, corporate 
governance and/or owner structure, possibly influence the accounting choices 
for software development costs when comparing two or more markets. 
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7. Further research 
 
Due to our findings, we believe that other factors affect the capitalization for 
development costs for software. Since many studies have shown that 
enforcement has influenced the accounting choice, we now have reasons to 
believe that it has a major effect on accounting choice for development costs 
as well. Therefore we believe it is of great interest for further research. Other 
incentives, for example management earnings, solidity, bonus systems, 
leverage and principal agent theory could also be of interest to study further. 
 
Other interesting subjects for further research concern the question how the 
differences between the two accounting systems have changed over the years. 
Since IASB and FASB are in the process of harmonizing the two regulations, 
the differences would have to decrease over the years.  
 
Also, it would be of interest to study the differences in the EU countries. Even 
though EU uses the same accounting standard, IFRS, the local enforcements 
and incentives may influence the accounting choice between the countries. 
Further, the different countries have reached different development stages in 
the software industry, which also influences the accounting for software 
development. Another interesting angle, could be to do the same study but in 
a different sector. 
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Appendix(1(
(
Sample'companies'EU'
ACANDO&'B'&
ACCESS&INTELLIGENCE&
ACTUAL&EXPERIENCE&
ADDNODE&'B'&
AFFECTO&
ALLOCATE&SOFTWARE&
ALTEC&HOLDINGS&
ALTRAN&TECHNOLOGIES&
ANITE&
ARCONTECH&GROUP&
ARRIA&NLG&
ARTILIUM&
ASSECO&POLAND&
ATOSS&SOFTWARE&
ATREM&
AUGUSTA&TCHG.&
AUSY&
AVANQUEST&SOFTWARE&
AVEVA&GROUP&
B3&SYSTEM&
BANGO&
BASWARE&
BECHTLE&
BLINKX&
BOND&INTL.SOFTWARE&
BRADY&
BULL&
BYTE&COMPUTER&
CAMELEON&SOFTWARE&
CASTLETON&TECHNOLOGY&
CEGEDIM&
CENIT&
CLOUDBUY&
COHERIS&ATIX&
COMP&SAFE&SUPPORT&
COMPTA&
COMPTEL&
COMPUCON&COMPUTER&APPS.&
COMPUGROUP&MEDICAL&
COMPUTACENTER&
COR&FJA&
CORERO&NETWORK&SECURITY&
CRANEWARE&
CYBERCOM&GROUP&EUROPE&
CYCOS&
DALET&
DASSAULT&SYSTEMES&
DELCAM&(OTC)&
DEVOTEAM&
DIGIA&
DOCDATA&
DOTDIGITAL&GROUP&
DRS&DATA&
EARTHPORT&
EASY&SOFTWARE&
EASYVISTA&
ECKOH&
ECONOCOM&GROUP&
EG&SOLUTIONS&
ELECTRONIC&DATA&PROC.&
ELEKTROBIT&
EMIS&GROUP&
ENEA&
ENTERSOFT&
EPSILON&NET&
ESCHER&GROUP&HOLDINGS&
ESI&GROUP&
ESKER&
EXACT&HOLDING&
FASECURE&
FABASOFT&
FIDESSA&GROUP&
FIRST&DERIVATIVES&
FORBIDDEN&TECHS.&
FORTHNET&
GB&GROUP&
GEMALTO&
GENERIX&
GEONG&INTERNATIONAL&
GFI&INFORMATIQUE&
GFT&TECHNOLOGIES&
GLOBAL&GRAPHICS&(BRU)&
GLOBO&
GROUP&BUSINESS&SOFTWARE&
HELLAS&ONLINE&
I&A&R&SYSTEMS&GROUP&
I&FAO&
IBS&
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IDEAGEN&
IDEAL&GROUP&CR&
IDOX&
IGE&+&XAO&
ILIAD&
ILYDA&CR&
IMAGINATIK&
INDIGOVISION&GROUP&
INDL.&&FINL.SYS.'B'&
INDRA&SISTEMAS&
INFOTEL&
INNELEC&MULTIMEDIA&
INNOFACTOR&
INNOVATION&GROUP&
INSTEM&
INTERCEDE&GROUP&
INTERNETQ&
INTERSHOP&COMMS.&
INVENSYS&(OTC)&
IOMART&GROUP&
IS&SOLUTIONS&
ISRA&VISION&
IVU&TRAFFIC&TECHS.&
IXONOS&
KALIBRATE&TECHNOLOGIES&
KEYWARE&TECHS.&
KOFAX&
LECTRA&
LOGISMOS&INFO.SYSTEMS&
LOMBARD&RISK&MANAGEMENT&
MAGIX&
MEDASYS&
MEVIS&MEDICAL&SOLUTIONS&
MICRO&FOCUS&INTL.&
MICROGEN&
MICROPOLE&
MLS&MULTIMEDIA&
MOPOWERED&GROUP&
N&RUNS&
NASSTAR&
NCC&GROUP&
NEDSENSE&ENTERPRISES&
NEMETSCHEK&
NET&
NETALOGUE&TECHNOLOGIES&
NETCALL&
NEXUS&
NOEMALIFE&
OCTO&TECHNOLOGY&
OMG&
ORDINA&
P& &I&PSNL.&&INFORMATIK&
PARITY&GROUP&
PERF.TECHS.IT&SOLUTIONS&
PHARMAGEST&INTERACTIVE&
PHOENIX&IT&GROUP&
PILAT&MEDIA&GLOBAL&DEAD&A&03/04/14&
PIRONET&NDH&
PIXELPARK&
PLENUM&
PROACTIS&HOLDINGS&
PROFILE&SYS.&.SOFTWARE&
PSI&
PUBLISHING&TECHNOLOGY&
QPR&SOFTWARE&
QSC&
QUEST&HOLDINGS&CR&
QUINDELL&
QUMAK&
QUOTIUM&TECHNO&
READSOFT&'B'&
REALTECH&
REALTIME&TECHNOLOGY&
REDITUS&
REPLY&
RIB&SOFTWARE&
RIGHTSTER&GROUP&
RM&
SAGE&GROUP&
SANDERSON&GROUP&
SAP&
SCISYS&
SDL&
SERVELEC&GROUP&
SERVICE&POWER&TECH.&
SIMCORP&
SIMPLE&
SINNERSCHRADER&
SNP&SCHNNEUR.&&PTN.&
SOFTING&
SOFTRONIC&'B'&
SOFTWARE&
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SOLTEQ&
SOLUCOM&
SOPHEON&
SOPRA&GROUP&SUSP&A&07/04/14&
SQLI&
SQS&SFTW.QUALITY&SYS.&
SSH&COMMUNICATIONS&
STARCOM&
STATPRO&GROUP&
STILO&INTERNATIONAL&
SWORD&GROUP&
SYGNITY&SA&
SYSTAR&UP&
TAS&TGA.AVANZATA&SISTEMI&
TECNOTREE&
TELES&
TIETO&OYJ&
TISCALI&
TRACSIS&
TRAINERS&HOUSE&
TRIAD&GROUP&
TXT&EASOLUTION&
UBISENSE&GROUP&
ULTRASIS&
UNIT&4&
UNITED&INTERNET&
UPDATE&SOFTWARE&
USU&SOFTWARE&
VELTI&(OTC)&
VIDAVO&HEALTH&TELEMATICS&
VISION&IT&GROUP&(D)&
WANDISCO&
WINCOR&NIXDORF&
XING&
ZETADISPLAY&
ZETES&INDUSTRIES&
ZOO&DIGITAL&GROUP&
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Sample'companies'USA'
ACCELERIZE&NEW&MEDIA&
ACCELRYS&
ACI&WORLDWIDE&
ACORN&ENERGY&
ACTUATE&
ADOBE&SYSTEMS&
ADVANCED&VISUAL&SYSTEMS&
ADVENT&SOFTWARE&
AKAMAI&TECHS.&
ALLOT&COMMUNICATIONS&
ALPHAPOINT&TECHNOLOGY&
ALSP.HLTHCR.SLTN.&
AMDOCS&
AMER.SOFTWARE&CL.A&
ANSYS&
AOL&
ARI&NETWORK&SERVICES&
ASPEN&TECHNOLOGY&
ASTEA&INTL.&
ATHENAHEALTH&
AUDIENCE&
AUTHENTIDATE&HOLDING&
AUTODESK&
AVG&TECHNOLOGIES&
AXION&INTERNATIONAL&HDG.&
BARRACUDA&NETWORKS&
BENEFITFOCUS&
BLACKBAUD&
BLUCORA&
BOINGO&WIRELESS&
BOTTOMLINE&TECHS.&
BRIDGELINE&DIGITAL&
BRIGHTCOVE&
BROADCAST&INTERNATIONAL&
BROADSOFT&
BROADVISION&
BSQUARE&
CA&
CADENCE&DESIGN&SYS.&
CALIX&NETWORKS&
CALLIDUS&SOFTWARE&
CARBONITE&
CDW&
CERNER&
CHANNELADVISOR&
CHECK&POINT&SFTW.TECHS.&
CHINA&INFORMATION&TECH.&
CICERO&
CIMATRON&
CIMETRIX&
CINEDIGM&CLASS&A&
CITRIX&SYS.&
CLICKSOFTWARE&TECHS.&
CMP.PROGRAMS& &SYS.&
COMM.INTELLIGENCE&
COMMVAULT&SYSTEMS&
COMPUTER&SCIS.&
COMPUTER&SVS.&
COMPUWARE&
COMVERSE&
CONCUR&TECHS.&
COPSYNC&
CORNERSTONE&ONDEMAND&
COROWARE&
COUNTERPATH&
COVERAALL&TECHNOLOGIES&
COVISINT&
CREXENDO&
CSG&SYS.INTL.&
CSP&
CTI&GROUP&HDG.&
CVENT&
CYAN&
CYNK&TECHNOLOGY&
CYREN&
DAEGIS&
DATALINK&
DATATRAK&INTL.&
DATAWATCH&
DEALERTRACK&TECHNOLOGIES&
DELTATHREE&
DEMANDWARE&
DESTINY&MEDIA&TECH.&
DIGIMARC&
DIGITAL&RIVER&
DYNAVOX&'A'&
EAFUTURE&INFO.TECH.&
E2OPEN&
EBIX&
EGAIN&
ELLIE&MAE&
ENDURANCE&INTL.GP.HDG.&
ENVESTNET&
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EPIQ&SYS.&
EVOLVING&SYSTEMS&
EXA&
EXPLORE&ANYWHERE&HLDG.&
FAB&UNIVERSAL&
FACEBOOK&CLASS&A&
FAIR&ISAAC&
FALCONSTOR&SFTW.&
FIREEYE&
FLEETMATICS&GROUP&
FORLINK&SFTW.&
FORTINET&
GARTNER&'A'&
GBS&ENTERPRISES&
GIGAMON&
GLOBALSCAPE&
GOGO&
GOOGLE&'A'&
GSE&SYSTEMS&
GUIDANCE&SOFTWARE&
GUIDEWIRE&SOFTWARE&
HOPTO&
IAC/INTERACTIVECORP&
ICEWEB&
ICG&GROUP&
IGLUE&
IMAGEWARE&SYS.&
IMMEDIATEK&
IMMERSION&
INFOBLOX&
INFORMATICA&
INKSURE&TECHS.&
INTACT.INTELLIGENCE&GP.&
INTELLIGENT&SYSTEMS&
INTERNAP&NETWORK&SVS.&
INTERNATIONAL&BUS.MCHS.&
INTERNATIONAL&LOTTERY&&&TOTALIZATO&
INTERXION&HOLDING&
INTRALINKS&HOLDINGS&
INTRUSION&
INTUIT&
IPASS&
J2&GLOBAL&
JIVE&SOFTWARE&
KEYW&HOLDING&
LABSTYLE&INNOVATIONS&
LEIDOS&HOLDINGS&
LIMELIGHT&NETWORKS&
LIVE&MICROSYSTEMS&
LIVEPERSON&
LOGMEIN&
LOOKSMART&
MAM&SOFTWARE&GROUP&
MANHATTAN&ASSOCS.&
MARIN&SOFTWARE&
MARKETO&
MAVENIR&SYSTEMS&
MEDASSETS&
MEDBOX&
MEDIDATA&SOLUTIONS&
MEETME&
MENTOR&GRAPHICS&
MER&TELEMANAGEMENT&SLTN.&
MERGE&HEALTHCARE&
MICROSOFT&
MICROSTRATEGY&
MILLENNIAL&MEDIA&
MINDSPRING&ENTREP.&(BER)&
MITEK&SYS.&
MOBILESMITH&
MOBIVITY&HOLDINGS&
MODEL&N&
MONOTYPE&IMAG.HDG.&
NET&MEDICAL&SOLUTIONS&
NETSCOUT&SYS.&
NETSUITE&
NEXUS&ENTERPRISE&SOLUTIONS&
NUANCE&COMMS.&
OMNICOMM&SYS.&
ORACLE&
PACIFIC&WEBWORKS&
PALO&ALTO&NETWORKS&
PARK&CITY&GROUP&
PASSUR&AEROSPACE&
PCATEL&
PDF&SOLUTIONS&
PEGASYSTEMS&
PERFICIENT&
PERION&NETWORK&
PLURES&TECHNOLOGIES&
PREMIER&CLASS&A&
PREMIERE&GLOBAL&SERVICES&
PROGRESS&SOFTWARE&
PROOFPOINT&
PROS&HOLDINGS&
PTC&
QAD&'B'&
QLIK&TECHNOLOGIES&
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QUALITY&SYSTEMS&
QUALYS&
QUOTEMEDIA&
RACKSPACE&HOSTING&
RALLY&SOFTWARE&DEV.&
REALPAGE&
RED&HAT&
RIGNET&
RINGCENTRAL&
ROCKET&FUEL&
ROOMLINX&
ROSETTA&STONE&
ROVI&
SAASMAX&
SAJAN&
SALESFORCE.COM&
SANTEON&GROUP&
SAPIENS&INTL.&
SCIEN.LEARNING&
SCIENCE&APPS.INTL.&
SCIQUEST&
SEDONA&
SELECTICA&
SERVICENOW&
SHUTTERSTOCK&
SILVER&SPRING&NETWORKS&
SIMULATIONS&PLUS&
SINA&
SINGLE&TOUCH&SYSTEMS&
SMITH&MICRO&SOFTWARE&
SMTP&
SOFTECH&
SOHU.COM&
SOLARWINDS&
SOLERA&HOLDINGS&
SPARE&BACKUP&
SPLUNK&
SPS&COMMERCE&
SS&C&TECHNOLOGIES&HDG.&
STREAMLINE&HEALTH&SLTN.&
STRIKEFORCE&TECHS.&
SUPPORT.COM&
SURNA&
SYMANTEC&
SYNACOR&
SYNCHRONOSS&TECHNOLOGIES&
SYNOPSYS&
TABLE&TRAC&
TABLEAU&SOFTWARE&CL.A&
TANGOE&
TELECM.SYSTEMS&'A'&
TELENAV&
TERADATA&
TEXTURA&
TIBCO&SOFTWARE&
TIGERLOGIC&
TOP&IMAGE&SYS.&
TOUCHPOINT&METRICS&
TRANSCOASTAL&
TRUNKBOW&INTL.HDG.&
TUCOWS&'A'&
TWITTER&
TYLER&TECHS.&
ULTIMATE&SOFTWARE&GP.&
UNISYS&
UNITED&ONLINE&
US&DATAWORKS&
VALIDIAN&
VARONIS&SYSTEMS&
VASCO&DATA&SCTY.INTL.&
VEEVA&SYSTEMS&CL.A&
VEMICS&
VERINT&SYS.&
VERISIGN&
VERITEC&
VIRNETX&HOLDING&
VMWARE&
VOCUS&
VOLTARI&
VRINGO&
WARP&9&
WAVE&SYS.'A'&
WEB.COM&GROUP&
WIRELESS&RONIN&TECHS.&
WIX&COM&
WORDLOGIC&
WORKDAY&CLASS&A&
XFORMITY&TECHS.&
YAHOO&
YANDEX&
ZIX&
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